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Abstract. I describe my investigations into the highly-secret role that Alan Tur-
ing played during World War II, after his pre-war theoretical work on computabil-
ity and the concept of a universal machine, in the development of the world’s first
electronic computers. These investigations resulted in my obtaining and publish-
ing, in 1972, some limited information about Turing’s contributions to the work
on code-breaking machines at Bletchley Park, the fore-runner of the UK Gov-
ernment Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). Some years later I was able to
obtain permission to compile and publish the first officially-authorised account of
the work, led by T.H. (Tommy) Flowers at the Post Office Dollis Hill Research
Station, on the construction of a series of special purpose electronic computers
for Bletchley Park, computers that made a vital contribution to the Allied war
effort.
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1 Introduction
There are many who are far better equipped than I am to speak of the various aspects
of the late great Alan Turing’s scientific career that are of direct technical relevance to
the CONCUR community. Instead, at the conference organisers’ request, in this year in
which the hundredth anniversary of his birth is being celebrated, I am going to tell you
of a historical investigation that I undertook some forty years ago into the then complete
mystery of what Alan Turing had worked on, in great secrecy, during World War II.
In about 1971 my growing interest in the history of computing led to my assem-
bling, with a view to publishing in book form, a representative set of papers and reports
documenting the many fascinating inventions and projects that eventually culminated
in the development of the “modern” electronic computer,
I took Charles Babbage’s work as my main starting point, and decided on a cut-
off date of 1949, when the first practical stored program electronic computer became
operational. So I planned on including material on ENIAC, EDVAC, the Manchester
“Baby” machine, and the Cambridge EDSAC, but decided to leave coverage of all the
many subsequent machines to other would-be computer historians.
I circulated a list of my planned set of documents to a number of colleagues for
comment – one of the responses I received queried the absence of Alan Turing from my
list. My excuse was that, to the best of my knowledge, Turing’s work on computers at
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the National Physical Laboratory (NPL) had post-dated Manchester’s and Cambridge’s
successful efforts, and that his pre-war work on computability, in which he described
what we now call a Turing Machine, was purely theoretical, and so fell outside the
chosen scope of my collection.
I had first become interested in computers in 1956 in my last year at Imperial Col-
lege. There weren’t many books on computers at that time – one was Faster than
Thought [1]. My 1955 copy of this book was probably my first source of knowledge
about both Babbage and Turing, and indeed about the work of the various early UK
computer projects, though soon afterwards I had learned much more about Babbage,
and his collaboration with Lady Lovelace, from the excellent Dover paperback Charles
Babbage and his Calculating Engines [13]. In Bowden I had read:
“The basic concepts and abstract principles of computation by a machine were
formulated by Dr. A.M. Turing, F.R.S. in a paper read before the London Math-
ematical Society in 1936, but work on such machines in Britain was delayed
by the war. In 1945, however, an examination of the problems was made at the
National Physical Laboratory by Mr. J.R. Womersley, then Superintendent of
the Mathematics Division of the Laboratory. He was joined by Dr. Turing and
a small staff of specialists . . . ”
However, piqued by the query about my having omitted Turing from my envisaged
collection, I set out to try to find out more about Turing’s work during the interval 1936-
1945. I obtained a copy of the 1959 biography by his mother, Mrs Sara Turing [26], to
find that its only indication of what her son had done during World War II was the
following:
“ . . . immediately on the declaration of war he was taken on as a Tempo-
rary Civil Servant in the Foreign Office, in the Department of Communica-
tions . . . At first even his whereabouts were kept secret, but later it was divulged
that he was working at Bletchley Park, Bletchley. No hint was ever given of the
nature of his secret work, nor has it ever been revealed.”
In fact by this time I had learned somehow that his wartime work had related to
code-breaking, though neither I nor any of my colleagues were familiar with the name
Bletchley Park. On rechecking my copy of David Kahn’s magnificent tome The Code-
breakers [10] I found Kahn’s statement that Bletchley Park was what the Foreign Of-
fice “euphemistically called its Department of Communications”, i.e. was the centre of
Britain’s wartime code-breaking efforts. However Kahn gave little information about
what was done at Bletchley Park, and made no mention of Turing.
At about this stage I came across the following statement by Lord Halsbury [6]:
“One of the most important events in the evolution of the modern computer was
a meeting of two minds which cross-fertilised one another at a critical epoch
in the technological development which they exploited. I refer of course to the
meeting of the late Doctors Turing and von Neumann during the war, and all
that came thereof . . . ”
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I wrote to Lord Halsbury, who in 1949 was Managing Director of the National Re-
search Development Corporation, the UK government body that had provided financial
support to several of the early UK computer projects. Unfortunately he could not recol-
lect the source of his information, his response (quoted in [16]) to my query being:
“I am afraid I cannot tell you more about the meeting between Turing and von
Neumann except that they met and sparked one another off. Each had, as it
were, half the picture in his head and the two halves came together during the
course of their meeting. I believe both were working on the mathematics of the
atomic bomb project.”
Inquiries of those of Turing’s colleagues who were still at NPL produced little, but
Donald Davies, who was then Superintendent of the Division of Computing Science
at NPL, arranged for me to visit Mrs Turing. She was very helpful and furnished me
with several further leads, but was not really able to add much to the very brief, and
unspecific, comments in her book.
Various other leads proved fruitless, and my enthusiasm for the search was be-
ginning to wane. I eventually had the opportunity to inspect a copy of Turing’s report
giving detailed plans for the ACE [25]. This proved to postdate, and even contain a
reference to, von Neumann’s First Draft of a Report on the EDVAC [14] so I did not ex-
amine it as carefully as I later realised I should have. However, I did note that Turing’s
report alluded to the fact that he had obtained much experience of electronic circuits.
2 Secret Wartime Computers
But then my investigation took a dramatic turn.
I had written to a number of people, seeking to understand more fully whether and
if so how Turing had contributed to the initial development of practical stored program
computers. One of my enquiries — to Donald Michie — elicited the following response
(quoted in [16]) :
“I believe that Lord Halsbury is right about the von Neumann-Turing meet-
ing . . . . The implication of Newman’s obituary notice, as you quote it1, is
quite misleading; but it depends a bit on what one means by: a ‘computer’.
If we restrict this to mean a stored-program digital machine, then Newman’s
implication is fair, because no-one conceived this device (apart from Babbage)
until Eckert and Mauchly (sometimes attributed to von Neumann). But if one
just means high-speed electronic digital computers, then Turing among others
was thoroughly familiar during the war with such equipment, which predated
ENIAC (itself not a stored-program machine) by a matter of years.”
1 The obituary notice for Turing [15], written by Professor M.H.A. Newman, who was associ-
ated with the post-war computer developments at Manchester University, stated that:
“At the end of the war many circumstances combined to turn his attention to the new
automatic computing machines. They were in principle realisations of the ‘universal
machine’ which he had described in the 1937 paper for the purpose of a logical argu-
ment, though their designers did not yet know of Turing’s work.”
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I then found that there had in fact already been several (rather obscure) references
in the open literature to the work at Bletchley Park with which Turing was associated,
of which the most startling was a paper by I.J. (Jack) Good [5]. This gave a listing of
successive generations of general purpose computers, including:
“Cryptanalytic (British): classified, electronic, calculated complicated Boolean
functions involving up to about 100 symbols, binary circuitry, electronic clock,
plugged and switched programs, punched paper tape for data input, typewriter
output, pulse repetition frequency 105, about 1000 gas-filled tubes; 1943 (M.H.A.
Newman, D. Michie, I.J. Good and M. Flowers. Newman was inspired by his
knowledge of Turing’s 1936 paper).” [(Tommy) Flowers’ initials were in fact
“T.H.”]
Furthermore Good’s paper went on to claim that there was a causal chain leading
from Turing’s 1936 paper [24] through the wartime cryptanalytic machine, to the first
Manchester computers, although it states that the main influence was from von Neu-
mann’s plans for the IAS machine (at Princeton University’s Institute for Advanced
Study).
Further details of Turing’s role, and the war-time code-breaking machines, were
provided in a letter I received from Tommy Flowers (quoted in [16]):
“In our war-time association, Turing and others provided the requirements for
machines which were top secret and have never been declassified. What I can
say about them is that they were electronic (which at that time was unique
and anticipated the ENIAC), with electromechanical input and output. They
were digital machines with wired programs. Wires on tags were used for semi-
permanent memories, and thermionic valve bi-stable circuits for temporary
memory. For one purpose we did in fact provide for variable programming
by means of lever keys which controlled gates which could be connected in
series and parallel as required, but of course the scope of the programming was
very limited. The value of the work I am sure to engineers like myself and
possibly to mathematicians like Alan Turing, was that we acquired a new un-
derstanding of and familiarity with logical switching and processing because
of the enhanced possibilities brought about by electronic technologies which
we ourselves developed. Thus when stored program computers became known
to us we were able to go right ahead with their development. It was lack of
funds which finally stopped us, not lack of know-how.”
Another person whom I had contacted in an effort to check the story of the Tur-
ing/von Neumann meeting was Dr S. Frankel, who had known von Neumann whilst
working at Los Alamos. Although unable to help in this matter, he provided further
evidence of the influence of Turing’s pre-war work (quoted in [16]):
“I know that in or about 1943 or ‘44 von Neumann was well aware of the fun-
damental importance of Turing’s paper of 1936 ‘On computable numbers . . . ’
which describes in principle the ‘Universal Computer’ of which every modern
computer (perhaps not ENIAC as first completed but certainly all later ones)
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is a realization. Von Neumann introduced me to that paper and at his urging I
studied it with care.”
By now I realised that I was onto a very big story indeed, and that I had been very
wrong to omit Turing’s name from the list of pioneers whose work should be covered
in my planned collection of documents on the origins of digital computers.
I prepared a confidential draft account of my investigation, which I sent to each of
the people who I had quoted, for their comments and to obtain permission to publish
what they had told me, and in the hope that my draft might prompt yet further revela-
tions. This hope was fulfilled, when in response Donald Michie amplified his comments
considerably. The information (quoted more fully in [16]) that he provided included:
“Turing was not directly involved in the design of the Bletchley electronic ma-
chines, although he was in touch with what was going on. He was, however,
concerned in the design of electromagnetic devices used for another cryptan-
alytic purpose; the Post Office engineer responsible for the hardware side of
this work was Bill Chandler . . . First machines: The ‘Heath Robinson’ was de-
signed by Wynn Williams . . . at the Telecommunications Research Establish-
ment at Malvern, and installed in 1942/1943. All machines, whether ‘Robin-
sons’ or ‘Colossi’, were entirely automatic in operation, once started. They
could only be stopped manually! Two five-channel paper tape loops, typically
of more than 1000 characters length, were driven by pulley-drive (aluminium
pulleys) at 2000 characters/sec. A rigid shaft, with two sprocket wheels, en-
gaged the sprocket-holes of the two tapes, keeping the two in alignment. Sec-
ond crop: The ‘Colossi’ were commissioned from the Post Office, and the first
installation was made in December 1943 (the Mark 1). This was so successful
that by great exertions the first of three more orders (for a Mark 2 version) was
installed before D-day (June 6th 1944). The project was under the direction of
T.H. Flowers, and on Flowers’ promotion, A.W.M. Coombs took over the re-
sponsibility of coordinating the work. The design was jointly done by Flowers,
Coombs, S.W. Broadbent and Chandler . . . There was only one pulley-driven
tape, the data tape. Any pre-set patterns which were to be stepped through these
data were generated internally from stored component-patterns. These compo-
nents were stored as ring registers made of thyrotrons and could be set manu-
ally by plug-in pins. The data tape was driven at 5000 characters/sec, but (for
the Mark 2) by a combination of parallel operations with short-term memory
an effective speed of 25,000/sec was obtained . . . The total number of Colossi
installed and on order was about a dozen by the end of the war, of which about
10 had actually been installed.”
So now the names of these still-secret machines had become known to me, and it
had become possible for me to attempt to assess the Colossi with respect to the modern
digital computer. It seemed clear that their arithmetical, as opposed to logical, capa-
bilities were minimal, involving only counting, rather than general addition or other
operations. They did, however, have a certain amount of electronic storage, as well as
paper-tape ‘backing storage’. Although fully automatic, even to the extent of providing
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printed output, they were very much special purpose machines, but within their field
of specialization the facilities provided by plug-boards and banks of switches afforded
a considerable degree of flexibility, by at least a rudimentary form of programming.
There seemed, however, no question of the Colossi being stored program computers,
and the exact sequence of developments, and patterns of influence, that led to the first
post-war British stored program computer projects remained very unclear.
At about this stage in my investigation I decided “nothing ventured nothing gained”
and wrote directly to Mr Edward Heath, the Prime Minister, urging that the UK Govern-
ment declassify Britain’s wartime electronic computer developments. In January 1972
my request was regretfully denied but Mr Heath assured me that a detailed report on the
project would be commissioned, though it would have to remain classified. (His reply
to me was for some time the only unclassified official document I knew of that in effect
admitted that Britain had built an electronic computer during World War II!)
The classified official history that the Prime Minister had commissioned following
my request was, it turns out, compiled by one of the engineers involved with Colos-
sus, Don Horwood [8]. Tony Sale recently described Horwood’s report as having been
“absolutely essential” to him when he set out in 1993 to recreate the Colossus [22].
3 The Stored Program Concept
The earliest suggestion that instructions be stored in the main computer memory, that I
knew of, was contained in von Neumann’s famous EDVAC report [14]. This describes
the various purposes for which memory capacity was needed — intermediate results,
instructions, tables of numerical constants — ending:
“The device requires a considerable memory. While it appeared that various
parts of this memory have to perform functions which differ somewhat in their
nature and considerably in their purpose, it is nevertheless tempting to treat the
entire memory as one organ, and to have its parts even as interchangeable as
possible for the various functions enumerated above.”
On the other hand, a later report by Eckert and Mauchly [4] claims that in early
1944, prior to von Neumann’s association with the EDVAC project, they had designed
a “magnetic calculating machine” in which the program would “be stored in exactly the
same sort of memory device as that used for numbers”.
These accounts imply that the idea of storing the program in the same memory as
that used for numerical values arose from considerations of efficient resource utiliza-
tion, and the need to fetch and decode instructions at a speed commensurate with that
of the basic computer operations. The question of who first had the idea of, and an un-
derstanding of the fundamental importance of, the full stored program concept, that is
of an extensive addressable internal memory, used for both instructions and numerical
qualities, together with the ability to program the modification of stored instructions,
has been for years a very vexed one. In particular there is no consensus regarding the
relative contributions of Eckert, Mauchly, von Neumann and Goldstine – a controversy
that I did not wish to enter into.
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What was indisputable was that the various papers and reports emanating from the
EDVAC group, from 1945 onwards, were a source of inspiration to computer designers
in many different countries, and played a vital part in the rapid development of the
modern computer. But Alan Turing’s role remained obscure.
The initial major goals of my investigation, which were to check out the story of a
decisive wartime meeting of von Neumann and Turing, and to establish whether Turing
had played a direct role in the development of the stored program computer concept, had
not been achieved. Instead, and perhaps more importantly, I had to my own surprise by
this stage accumulated evidence that in 1943, two to three years before ENIAC, which
hitherto had been generally accepted as having been the world’s first electronic digital
computer, became operational, a group of people directed by M.H.A. Newman and
T.H. Flowers, and with which Alan Turing was associated, had built a working special
purpose electronic digital computer, the Colossus.
I had established that this computer was developed at the Post Office’s Dollis Hill
Research Station, and installed at Bletchley Park. The Colossus, and its successors,
were in at least a limited sense ‘program-controlled’. Moreover, there were believable
claims that Turing’s classic pre-war paper on computability, a paper which is usually
regarded as being of ‘merely’ theoretical importance, was a direct influence on the
British machine’s designers, and also on von Neumann, at a time when he was becoming
involved in American computer developments.
Having obtained permission from all my informants to use the information that they
had provided to me, I and Donald Michie were keen that a summary of my investiga-
tion [16] be placed in the public domain. The vehicle we chose was his 1972 Machine
Intelligence Workshop, the proceedings of which were published by Edinburgh Univer-
sity Press.
Afterwards, I managed to persuade Donald to contribute a two page summary of
my findings, and thus at last some coverage of Turing, to my collection of historical
computer documents – a collection that was published in 1973 by Springer-Verlag as
The Origins of Digital Computers: Selected Papers [17].
4 Ultra Revelations
There things rested, and it seemed possible that it might be a long time before any-
thing more would become public about Bletchley Park, Alan Turing’s work there, or
the Colossus Project.
But then in spring 1974 the official ban on any reference to Ultra, a code name
for information obtained at Bletchley Park from decrypted German message traffic,
was relaxed somewhat, and Frederick Winterbotham’s book The Ultra Secret [27] was
published. This was the “story of how, during World War II, the highest form of intelli-
gence, obtained from the ‘breaking’ of the supposedly ‘unbreakable’ German machine
cyphers, was ‘processed’ and distributed with complete security to President Roosevelt,
Winston Churchill, and all the principal Chiefs of Staff and commanders in the field
throughout the war”. The book caused a sensation, and brought Bletchley Park, the
Enigma cipher machine, and the impact on the war of the breaking of wartime Enigma
traffic, to the general public’s attention in a very big way.
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The book’s one reference to computers came in the statement, “It is no longer a
secret that the backroom boys of Bletchley used the new science of electronics to help
them . . . I am not of the computer age nor do I attempt to understand them, but early in
1940 I was ushered with great solemnity into the shrine where stood a bronze coloured
face, like some Eastern Goddess who was destined to become, the oracle of Bletchley”.
No mention was made of Alan Turing, or any of the others who I had learned were
involved with Bletchley’s code-breaking machines.
A further, even more sensational, book Bodyguard of Lies [3] then revealed more
about how the Germans had been using Enigma cipher machines, and gave some infor-
mation about the work of first the Polish cryptanalysts, and then of Turing and others at
Bletchley Park on a machine called the “Bombe” that was devised for breaking Enigma
codes. However it made no mention of computers and referred to electronics only in
connection with radar and radio; its main topic was the immense impact of all this work
on the Allies’ conduct of the war.
Emboldened by what seemed to be a rather significant change in Government pol-
icy concerning discussion of Bletchley Park’s activities, I made some enquiries as to
whether another request to declassify the Colossus Project might now have a chance of
being treated favourably. I was strongly urged not to write to the Prime Minister again
– apparently my earlier request had caused considerable waves on both sides of the
Atlantic. Instead, on the advice of David Kahn, I wrote on 4 Nov 1974 to Sir Leonard
Hooper, who David Kahn described as being the former head of GCHQ, and who was
by then an Under Secretary in the Cabinet Office, I believe with the title Co-ordinator
for Intelligence and Security. After a brief exchange of correspondence, in a letter from
Sir Leonard dated 22 May 1975 I received the welcome news that “approval had been
given for the release of some information about the equipment”, and that it was pro-
posed to release some wartime photographs of Colossus to the Public Record Office. I
was invited to come to London for discussions at the Cabinet Office. This visit occurred
on 2 July 1975.
When I arrived, somewhat nervously, in the Cabinet Office building I was escorted
to a panelled room where I met Sir Leonard Hooper, his personal assistant, and a Dr
Ralph Benjamin. (I do not recall whether it was then, or later, that I learned that Dr
Benjamin was GCHQ Chief Scientist.) I was shown the photographs, and we discussed
in detail the wording of the explanatory document.
And then I was told that the Government were willing to facilitate my interviewing
the people who had led the Colossus Project, after they had been briefed as to just what
topics they were allowed to discuss with me. This was with a view to my being allowed
to write a history of the project, providing that I would submit my account for approval
prior to publication. Needless to say I agreed.
The photographs and explanatory document were made available at the Public Record
Office (now The National Archives) on the 25th October 1975, and I had the pleasure
of sending a letter (now on display in the Turing Exhibition at Bletchley Park) to Mrs
Turing, informing her that “the Government have recently made an official release of
information which contains an explicit recognition of the importance of your son’s work
to the development of the modern computer”.
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During the period October-December 1975 I interviewed the leading Colossus de-
signers: Tommy Flowers (twice), Bill Chandler, Sidney Broadhurst, and Allen ‘Doc’
Coombs. I found all four of them to be delightful individuals, immensely impressive,
and amazingly modest about their achievements. All were unfailingly pleasant and help-
ful as they tried to recollect happenings at Dollis Hill and Bletchley Park. I had the fur-
ther pleasure of interviewing Max Newman and Donald Michie, and David Kahn kindly
interviewed Jack Good for me at his home in Roanoke, Virginia. I also corresponded,
in some cases quite intensively, with all these interviewees, and with a considerable
number of other people, including several of the Americans who had been stationed at
Bletchley Park.
Each interview was tape-recorded, and I had the tapes transcribed in full. The people
I interviewed and corresponded with were being asked to recall happenings of thirty or
so years earlier, and to do so without any opportunity of inspecting original files and
documents. Secrecy considerations had been paramount and had given rise to a rigid
compartmentalisation of activities. Few had any detailed knowledge of the work of
people outside their own small group. Many of them had made conscious efforts to try
and forget about their wartime work.
Piecing together all the information I thus obtained, and even establishing a reason-
ably accurate chronology, was therefore very difficult. I was greatly aided in this task by
the advice I’d read in Kenneth May’s magnificent Bibliography and Research Manual
on the History of Mathematics [12]. For example, the techniques that he described for
creating and using a set of correlated card indexes greatly helped me in sorting out a
major chronological confusion amongst my interviewees concerning the development
of the Robinson machines.
What became clear from my discussions with the Colossus designers was that their
interactions with Turing had mainly occurred on projects that preceded Colossus. My
investigation led me to summarize their and other’s attitude to him as follows (quoted
from [18]):
“Turing, clearly, was viewed with considerable awe by most of his colleagues
at Bletchley because of his evident intellect and the great originality and impor-
tance of his contributions, and by many with considerable discomfort because
his personality was so outlandish. Many people found him incomprehensible,
perhaps being intimidated by his reputation but more likely being put off by
his character and mannerisms. But all of the Post Office engineers who worked
with him say that they found him very easy to understand — Broadhurst char-
acterised him as ‘a born teacher — he could put any obscure point very well’.
Their respect for him was immense, though as Chandler said ‘the least said
about him as an engineer the better’. This point is echoed by Michie who said
‘he was intrigued by devices of every kind, whether abstract or concrete – his
friends thought it would be better if he kept to the abstract devices but that
didn’t deter him’.”
I submitted the draft of my paper on Colossus to Dr Benjamin on 12 April 1976.
Subsequent correspondence and discussions with Dr Benjamin and Mr Horwood led to
my incorporating a number of relatively small changes into the paper and its abstract,
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the main effect of which was to remove any explicit indication that the projects I was
describing were in fact related to code-breaking. I was merely allowed to say that “The
nature of the work that was undertaken at Bletchley Park during World War II is still
officially secret but statements have been appearing in published works in recent years
which strongly suggest that it included an important part of the British Government’s
cryptologic effort”. This, and the fact I was allowed to retain references to books such
as The Ultra Secret and Bodyguard of Lies, however meant that readers would be left in
little doubt as to what Turing and his colleagues had been engaged in, and the purpose
of the Robinson and Colossus machines.
5 The Outing of Colossus
The cleared paper was then submitted to the International Conference on the History of
Computing, which was held in Los Alamos in June 1976. (No attempt is made to detail
the contents of this 21,000-word paper here!)
Doc Coombs and his wife were planning to be on vacation in the States at about
the time of the conference, so to my delight he suggested that he accompany me to the
conference and I arranged for him to participate. It is fair to say that my presentation
created a sensation – how could it not, given the material I had been allowed to gather?
I have recently found that Bob Bemer has reported2 his impressions of the event:
“I was there at a very dramatic moment of the invitational International Re-
search Conference on the History of Computing, in Los Alamos . . . Among
the many that I conversed with was a medium-sized Englishman named Dr.
A.W.M. Coombs, who was so excited about something that he was literally
bouncing up and down. Not being bashful I asked (and he didn’t mind) about
the cause of his excitement, and he replied ‘You’ll know tomorrow morning
– you’ll know’. Saturday morning we regathered in the Auditorium of the
Physics Division. I sat third row from the front, a couple seats in from the
right, to get a good view of all the famous attendees. To my left in the same
row, three empty seats intervening, was the bouncy Englishman, all smiles and
laughter. In front of him, two seats to his left, was Professor Konrad Zuse . . . In
the fifth row, again to the left, was Dr. John Mauchly, of ENIAC fame. On stage
came Prof. Brian Randell, asking if anyone had ever wondered what Alan Tur-
ing had done during World War II? He then showed slides of a place called
Bletchley Park, home base of the British cryptographic services during that pe-
riod. After a while he showed us a slide of a lune-shaped aperture device he
had found in a drawer whilst rummaging around there3. Turned out it was part
of a 5000-character-per-second (!) paper tape reader. From there he went on
to tell the story of Colossus, the world’s really first electronic computer . . . I
looked at Mauchly, who had thought up until that moment that he was involved
in inventing the world’s first electronic computer. I have heard the expression
2 http://www.bobbemer.com/COLOSSUS.HTM (checked 14 May 2012)
3 In fact it was one of the Colossus team that found this aperture device, which is now on show
with some other small Colossus artefacts at Newcastle University.
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many times about jaws dropping, but I had really never seen it happen before.
And Zuse – with a facial expression that could have been anguish. I’ll never
know whether it was national, in that Germany lost the war in part because he
was not permitted to build his electronic computer, or if it was professional,
in that he could have taken first honors in the design of the world’s most mar-
velous tool. But my English friend was the man doing the day-to-day running
of Colossus. I saw then why he was so terribly excited. Just imagine the relief
of a man who, a third of a century later, could at last answer his children on
‘What did you do in the war, Daddy?’.”
The conference organisers hurriedly organised an additional evening session, at
which Doc Coombs and I fielded a barrage of questions from a packed audience. Doc
Coombs’ role at this session became that of adding detail to some of the events that my
paper described rather guardedly, and mine became at least in part that of endeavouring
to make sure that his splendidly ebullient character did not lead him to too many indis-
cretions. (Tommy Flowers had beforehand warned me that “in his natural exuberance
[Doc Coombs] is likely to give away too much for the Foreign Office and you should
be careful not to provoke him!”)
My paper was promptly published and circulated widely as a Newcastle University
Computing Laboratory Technical Report [18] - the proceedings of the Los Alamos con-
ference did not appear until four years later [20]. In addition, a summary version of my
paper, including all the Colossus photographs, was published in the New Scientist in
February 1977 [19], after I had also cleared this with the authorities. This version was
afterwards included in the third and final edition of my book The Origins of Digital
Computers [21] in place of the earlier two-page account by Michie.
Some time in early 1976, I believe, I became aware that BBC Television were plan-
ning the Secret War series, and that the sixth, and originally last, episode (entitled Still
Secret) was going to be about Enigma. I met with the producer of this episode, Do-
minic Flessati, told him — very guardedly — about the Colossus, and showed him the
Colossus photographs, at which he became very excited.
The result of this meeting was that Flessati revised his plans for the sixth episode
in The Secret War series, so as to cover Colossus as well as Enigma. The BBC brought
their formidable research resources to bear on the making of this episode. The Enigma
section of the episode gave extensive details of the work of the Polish cryptanalysts who
originally broke Enigma, how the Enigma worked, and how Bletchley Park made use of
a large number of machines, the so-called “bombes”, designed by Alan Turing and Gor-
don Welchman to break Enigma traffic on an industrial scale. It also took the Colossus
story on somewhat further than I had managed. For the Colossus section of Still Secret
they interviewed Tommy Flowers, Gordon Welchman, Max Newman, and Jack Good,
mainly on camera, and filmed a number of scenes at Dollis Hill and Bletchley Park, as
well as showing the official Colossus photographs.
Whereas I had had to be very guarded in my paper regarding the purpose of the
Colossus, Still Secret made it abundantly clear that Colossus was used to help break
high-level German messages sent in a telegraphic code, via a machine that it said was
called a Geheimschreiber (“secret writer”). However the machine that it described, and
whose workings it showed, was a teleprinter-based device made by Siemens & Halske.
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It was in fact a number of years before this inaccurate identification of the target of the
Colossus project was corrected and it became known that the Colossus was in fact used
to help break teleprinter messages that were enciphered using a separate ciphering de-
vice (the SZ40/42 made by Lorenz AG) to which an ordinary teleprinter was connected,
rather than an enciphering teleprinter.
6 The Aftermath
The TV series was very successful when it was broadcast in early 1977. Undoubtedly
it, and the accompanying book [9] by the overall editor of the series, did much to bring
Bletchley Park, Alan Turing, the Enigma and the Colossus to public attention, though
it was some years before there was a general awareness that Colossus was not used
against Enigma, and one still occasionally sees confusion over this point.
My original query, concerning the story of a wartime meeting between Turing and
von Neumann at which the seeds of the modern computer were planted remained —
and remains — unanswered. The present general consensus, with which I tend to agree,
dismisses this as a legend. However I should mention that after my account was pub-
lished one senior US computer scientist, well-connected with the relevant authorities
there, did hint to me rather strongly that it would be worth my continuing my quest!
But nothing ever came of this, I’m afraid.
I did feel that my investigations had cleared up some of the more important miscon-
ceptions and misattributions regarding the stored program computer concept, not least
exactly what the concept involved. However, my investigation of Turing’s postwar work
at NPL did not match the thoroughness with which Carpenter & Doran [2] analyzed his
1945 design for ACE. Their comparison of the fully-developed stored program facili-
ties that Turing proposed in 1945 for the ACE against the rather rudimentary ones in
the EDVAC report that slightly predated it [14], and which he cited, indicate to me that
I really should have included at least some of Turing’s 1945 Report, in my collection of
selected papers.
There was one very amusing aftermath, as far as I was concerned, of my involve-
ment with the BBC television programme. I had been asked by Domenic Flessati to tell
him the next time I would be in London after the TV series had been broadcast, so that
we could have a celebratory dinner. This I did, and we met on the front steps of Bush
House, where he introduced me to Sue Bennett, his researcher for Still Secret, in the fol-
lowing terms “Miss Bennett, I’d like you to meet Professor Randell, the ‘Deep Throat’
of the Secret War series.” I’m rarely left speechless, but this was one of the occasions!
One final happening in 1977 needs to be mentioned – the conferment on Tommy
Flowers of an Honorary Doctorate by Newcastle University, an event that was reported
prominently by The Times the next day [23]. I take great pride in the fact that I played a
role in arranging this very belated public recognition for his tremendous achievement.
7 Concluding Remarks
By way of a Conclusion, one further Newcastle-related incident is worth reporting. At
my invitation Professor Harry Hinsley, a Bletchley Park veteran and senior author of
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the multi-volume official history British Intelligence in the Second World War [7], gave
a Public Lecture at Newcastle University, soon after the first volume was published in
1979. His lecture was on the subject of the impact of Bletchley Park’s activities on
the war. One of the questions he received after his lecture was “If this work was so
significant, why didn’t it shorten the War?” His reply was short and to the point: “It did,
by about two years!”
As I indicated earlier, the request that I devote this lecture to my investigation into
Turing’s wartime work was motivated by the overall relevance of his career to the CON-
CUR community. Interestingly, there is a link between my 1970s historical investigation
and my own most recent computer science research, which in fact is directly related to
your topic of concurrency. This research concerns a new formalism, based on occur-
rence nets, for representing the activity of a complex evolving system [11]. One of the
potential applications of this research is to the design of software for supporting large-
scale crime and accident investigations.
I have in this lecture described the problems that I had in piecing together a coherent
account of the work at Bletchley Park from a large amount of fragmentary evidence,
e.g. even the basic problem of establishing an overall chronology of events. I have
mentioned that I had been greatly helped in overcoming these problems by the use of
Kenneth May’s card index system. I now realise how much more useful to me might
have been the sort of (criminal) investigation support system that is now one focus of
my current research – but that is another story, for another time.
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